Authors: David S. Jonas, Erielle Davidson
When the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (“INARA”) was first proposed, it was touted as a serious hurdle to
the Obama Administration’s conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), a non-legally binding plurilateral arms control agreement aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. At the time of its passage, Senator Bob Corker, a Republican from Tennessee, one of the main architects of INARA, boasted that the legislation took “power back from the president” by compelling congressional review of the JCPOA (and any future agreement with Tehran), regardless of whether the agreement was legally binding. Then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, assured on the Senate floor that INARA “offers the best chance to provide the American people, and the Congress they elect, with power to weigh in on a vital issue.” In short, it was seen by many as practicable and objectively good legislation.
